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The liar paradox and Godel's first incompleteness theorem. / Tselishcev, Vitaly.

в: Schole, Том 11, № 2, 01.01.2017, стр. 415-427.

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Harvard

Tselishcev, V 2017, 'The liar paradox and Godel's first incompleteness theorem', Schole, Том. 11, № 2, стр. 415-427. https://doi.org/10.21267/AQUILO.2017.11.6471

APA

Tselishcev, V. (2017). The liar paradox and Godel's first incompleteness theorem. Schole, 11(2), 415-427. https://doi.org/10.21267/AQUILO.2017.11.6471

Vancouver

Tselishcev V. The liar paradox and Godel's first incompleteness theorem. Schole. 2017 янв. 1;11(2):415-427. doi: 10.21267/AQUILO.2017.11.6471

Author

Tselishcev, Vitaly. / The liar paradox and Godel's first incompleteness theorem. в: Schole. 2017 ; Том 11, № 2. стр. 415-427.

BibTeX

@article{68c9da7a3da44f9b920fb5a1e62594af,
title = "The liar paradox and Godel's first incompleteness theorem",
abstract = "The article critically analyzes the example of the incorrect application of metamathematics, in particular, G{\"o}del's First incompleteness theorem, to the explication of the Liar Paradox by J. Barker. It is shown that an explication of this kind, doubting well known Tarki's definition of truth, is based on the erroneous use of key G{\"o}del constructions - substitution idea and the diagonal lemma. The criticism of the proclamation by Barker of the explication of the Liar as a mathematical theorem shows certain limitations in demonstrating the heuristic analogy between the Liar's sentence and the Godelian sentence.",
keywords = "Explication, Godel's theorem, Liar paradox, Self-reference, Truth predicate, self-reference, truth predicate, explication",
author = "Vitaly Tselishcev",
year = "2017",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.21267/AQUILO.2017.11.6471",
language = "English",
volume = "11",
pages = "415--427",
journal = "Schole",
issn = "1995-4328",
publisher = "Novosibirskij Gosudarstvennyj Universitet",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The liar paradox and Godel's first incompleteness theorem

AU - Tselishcev, Vitaly

PY - 2017/1/1

Y1 - 2017/1/1

N2 - The article critically analyzes the example of the incorrect application of metamathematics, in particular, Gödel's First incompleteness theorem, to the explication of the Liar Paradox by J. Barker. It is shown that an explication of this kind, doubting well known Tarki's definition of truth, is based on the erroneous use of key Gödel constructions - substitution idea and the diagonal lemma. The criticism of the proclamation by Barker of the explication of the Liar as a mathematical theorem shows certain limitations in demonstrating the heuristic analogy between the Liar's sentence and the Godelian sentence.

AB - The article critically analyzes the example of the incorrect application of metamathematics, in particular, Gödel's First incompleteness theorem, to the explication of the Liar Paradox by J. Barker. It is shown that an explication of this kind, doubting well known Tarki's definition of truth, is based on the erroneous use of key Gödel constructions - substitution idea and the diagonal lemma. The criticism of the proclamation by Barker of the explication of the Liar as a mathematical theorem shows certain limitations in demonstrating the heuristic analogy between the Liar's sentence and the Godelian sentence.

KW - Explication

KW - Godel's theorem

KW - Liar paradox

KW - Self-reference

KW - Truth predicate

KW - self-reference

KW - truth predicate

KW - explication

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85026903859&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.21267/AQUILO.2017.11.6471

DO - 10.21267/AQUILO.2017.11.6471

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85026903859

VL - 11

SP - 415

EP - 427

JO - Schole

JF - Schole

SN - 1995-4328

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 9966964