Standard

Teams and individuals in standard auction formats: decisions and emotions. / Karmeliuk, Maria; Kocher, Martin G.; Schmidt, Georg.

в: Experimental Economics, Том 25, № 5, 11.2022, стр. 1327-1348.

Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование

Harvard

Karmeliuk, M, Kocher, MG & Schmidt, G 2022, 'Teams and individuals in standard auction formats: decisions and emotions', Experimental Economics, Том. 25, № 5, стр. 1327-1348. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09769-4

APA

Karmeliuk, M., Kocher, M. G., & Schmidt, G. (2022). Teams and individuals in standard auction formats: decisions and emotions. Experimental Economics, 25(5), 1327-1348. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09769-4

Vancouver

Karmeliuk M, Kocher MG, Schmidt G. Teams and individuals in standard auction formats: decisions and emotions. Experimental Economics. 2022 нояб.;25(5):1327-1348. doi: 10.1007/s10683-022-09769-4

Author

Karmeliuk, Maria ; Kocher, Martin G. ; Schmidt, Georg. / Teams and individuals in standard auction formats: decisions and emotions. в: Experimental Economics. 2022 ; Том 25, № 5. стр. 1327-1348.

BibTeX

@article{00c3b068e11447dc9f47e8735f2e33c4,
title = "Teams and individuals in standard auction formats: decisions and emotions",
abstract = "Our study compares individual and team bidding in standard auction formats: first-price, second-price and ascending-price (English) auctions with independent private values. In a laboratory experiment, we find that individuals overbid more than teams in first-price auctions and deviate more from bidding their own value in second-price auctions. However, we observe no difference in bidding behavior in English auctions. Based on control variables, we provide evidence that the observed difference could be explained by better reasoning abilities of teams. Emotions seem to play a role in determining bids, but the effect of emotions on bidding does not differ between individuals and teams.",
keywords = "Auctions, Experiment, Overbidding, Team decision-making",
author = "Maria Karmeliuk and Kocher, {Martin G.} and Georg Schmidt",
note = "Funding Information: Financial support by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through CRC TRR 190 (project number 280092119) is gratefully acknowledged. We are grateful to Fangfang Tan for very helpful comments and to two anonymous referees and the editor whose suggestions improved the paper a lot. The replication material for the study is available at: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6946038 . Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Economic Science Association.",
year = "2022",
month = nov,
doi = "10.1007/s10683-022-09769-4",
language = "English",
volume = "25",
pages = "1327--1348",
journal = "Experimental Economics",
issn = "1386-4157",
publisher = "Springer Science and Business Media B.V.",
number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Teams and individuals in standard auction formats: decisions and emotions

AU - Karmeliuk, Maria

AU - Kocher, Martin G.

AU - Schmidt, Georg

N1 - Funding Information: Financial support by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through CRC TRR 190 (project number 280092119) is gratefully acknowledged. We are grateful to Fangfang Tan for very helpful comments and to two anonymous referees and the editor whose suggestions improved the paper a lot. The replication material for the study is available at: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6946038 . Publisher Copyright: © 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Economic Science Association.

PY - 2022/11

Y1 - 2022/11

N2 - Our study compares individual and team bidding in standard auction formats: first-price, second-price and ascending-price (English) auctions with independent private values. In a laboratory experiment, we find that individuals overbid more than teams in first-price auctions and deviate more from bidding their own value in second-price auctions. However, we observe no difference in bidding behavior in English auctions. Based on control variables, we provide evidence that the observed difference could be explained by better reasoning abilities of teams. Emotions seem to play a role in determining bids, but the effect of emotions on bidding does not differ between individuals and teams.

AB - Our study compares individual and team bidding in standard auction formats: first-price, second-price and ascending-price (English) auctions with independent private values. In a laboratory experiment, we find that individuals overbid more than teams in first-price auctions and deviate more from bidding their own value in second-price auctions. However, we observe no difference in bidding behavior in English auctions. Based on control variables, we provide evidence that the observed difference could be explained by better reasoning abilities of teams. Emotions seem to play a role in determining bids, but the effect of emotions on bidding does not differ between individuals and teams.

KW - Auctions

KW - Experiment

KW - Overbidding

KW - Team decision-making

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85137913373&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/f37781b5-2529-3c7e-94fc-f2b9017dd454/

U2 - 10.1007/s10683-022-09769-4

DO - 10.1007/s10683-022-09769-4

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85137913373

VL - 25

SP - 1327

EP - 1348

JO - Experimental Economics

JF - Experimental Economics

SN - 1386-4157

IS - 5

ER -

ID: 38057948