Standard

On a Three-Level Competitive Pricing Problem with Uniform and Mill Pricing Strategies. / Gubareva, A. V.; Panin, A. A.; Plyasunov, A. V. и др.

в: Journal of Applied and Industrial Mathematics, Том 13, № 1, 01.01.2019, стр. 54-64.

Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование

Harvard

Gubareva, AV, Panin, AA, Plyasunov, AV & Som, LV 2019, 'On a Three-Level Competitive Pricing Problem with Uniform and Mill Pricing Strategies', Journal of Applied and Industrial Mathematics, Том. 13, № 1, стр. 54-64. https://doi.org/10.1134/S1990478919010071

APA

Gubareva, A. V., Panin, A. A., Plyasunov, A. V., & Som, L. V. (2019). On a Three-Level Competitive Pricing Problem with Uniform and Mill Pricing Strategies. Journal of Applied and Industrial Mathematics, 13(1), 54-64. https://doi.org/10.1134/S1990478919010071

Vancouver

Gubareva AV, Panin AA, Plyasunov AV, Som LV. On a Three-Level Competitive Pricing Problem with Uniform and Mill Pricing Strategies. Journal of Applied and Industrial Mathematics. 2019 янв. 1;13(1):54-64. doi: 10.1134/S1990478919010071

Author

Gubareva, A. V. ; Panin, A. A. ; Plyasunov, A. V. и др. / On a Three-Level Competitive Pricing Problem with Uniform and Mill Pricing Strategies. в: Journal of Applied and Industrial Mathematics. 2019 ; Том 13, № 1. стр. 54-64.

BibTeX

@article{d9cbec3a257346389dc26f807f3ac94c,
title = "On a Three-Level Competitive Pricing Problem with Uniform and Mill Pricing Strategies",
abstract = "Under study is a three-level pricing problem formulated as a Stackelberg game in which the two companies, the Leader and the Follower, compete with each other for customers demand by setting prices for homogeneous products on their facilities. The first decision is made by the Leader. Then, having full information about the Leader{\textquoteright}s choice, the Follower makes his own decision.After that each customer chooses the facilitywithminimal service costs to be serviced from. The Leader and the Follower use different pricing strategies: uniform and mill pricing respectively. We study the behavior of company revenues depending on the number of facilities. For this, an exact decomposition type algorithm is proposed. Moreover, we developed a hybrid approximation algorithm that is based on the variable neighborhood descent and coordinate descent.",
keywords = "competitive pricing problem, coordinate descent, decomposition, exact and approximate algorithm, Stackelberg game, three-level problem, uniform and mill pricing, variable neighborhood descent",
author = "Gubareva, {A. V.} and Panin, {A. A.} and Plyasunov, {A. V.} and Som, {L. V.}",
year = "2019",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1134/S1990478919010071",
language = "English",
volume = "13",
pages = "54--64",
journal = "Journal of Applied and Industrial Mathematics",
issn = "1990-4789",
publisher = "Maik Nauka-Interperiodica Publishing",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - On a Three-Level Competitive Pricing Problem with Uniform and Mill Pricing Strategies

AU - Gubareva, A. V.

AU - Panin, A. A.

AU - Plyasunov, A. V.

AU - Som, L. V.

PY - 2019/1/1

Y1 - 2019/1/1

N2 - Under study is a three-level pricing problem formulated as a Stackelberg game in which the two companies, the Leader and the Follower, compete with each other for customers demand by setting prices for homogeneous products on their facilities. The first decision is made by the Leader. Then, having full information about the Leader’s choice, the Follower makes his own decision.After that each customer chooses the facilitywithminimal service costs to be serviced from. The Leader and the Follower use different pricing strategies: uniform and mill pricing respectively. We study the behavior of company revenues depending on the number of facilities. For this, an exact decomposition type algorithm is proposed. Moreover, we developed a hybrid approximation algorithm that is based on the variable neighborhood descent and coordinate descent.

AB - Under study is a three-level pricing problem formulated as a Stackelberg game in which the two companies, the Leader and the Follower, compete with each other for customers demand by setting prices for homogeneous products on their facilities. The first decision is made by the Leader. Then, having full information about the Leader’s choice, the Follower makes his own decision.After that each customer chooses the facilitywithminimal service costs to be serviced from. The Leader and the Follower use different pricing strategies: uniform and mill pricing respectively. We study the behavior of company revenues depending on the number of facilities. For this, an exact decomposition type algorithm is proposed. Moreover, we developed a hybrid approximation algorithm that is based on the variable neighborhood descent and coordinate descent.

KW - competitive pricing problem

KW - coordinate descent

KW - decomposition

KW - exact and approximate algorithm

KW - Stackelberg game

KW - three-level problem

KW - uniform and mill pricing

KW - variable neighborhood descent

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85064809185&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1134/S1990478919010071

DO - 10.1134/S1990478919010071

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85064809185

VL - 13

SP - 54

EP - 64

JO - Journal of Applied and Industrial Mathematics

JF - Journal of Applied and Industrial Mathematics

SN - 1990-4789

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 19649641