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An Analog of the Bondareva–Shapley Theorem. II. Examples of V-Balanced Fuzzy Games. / Vasil’ev, V. A.
в: Automation and Remote Control, Том 82, № 2, 02.2021, стр. 364-374.Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование
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TY - JOUR
T1 - An Analog of the Bondareva–Shapley Theorem. II. Examples of V-Balanced Fuzzy Games
AU - Vasil’ev, V. A.
N1 - Funding Information: This work was supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, project no. 16-06-00101. Publisher Copyright: © 2021, Pleiades Publishing, Ltd. Copyright: Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2021/2
Y1 - 2021/2
N2 - This paper continues the research work [2], which generalizes the well-known Bondareva–Shapleytheorem to the case of fuzzy cooperative n-player games. Theconditions of V-balancedness are studied for three classes of fuzzygames as follows: 1) fuzzy transferable utility (TU) market games [3]; 2) fuzzy games associated with the linear-productionmodels [6]; 3) fuzzy games generated by therational distribution models of public costs during the construction of transport infrastructurefacilities (the so-called airport games [5]). Inaddition to the conditions guaranteeing the non-emptiness of the cores, some types ofnon-dominated imputations of these games are also described. For the fuzzy airport games, such adescription is exhaustive.
AB - This paper continues the research work [2], which generalizes the well-known Bondareva–Shapleytheorem to the case of fuzzy cooperative n-player games. Theconditions of V-balancedness are studied for three classes of fuzzygames as follows: 1) fuzzy transferable utility (TU) market games [3]; 2) fuzzy games associated with the linear-productionmodels [6]; 3) fuzzy games generated by therational distribution models of public costs during the construction of transport infrastructurefacilities (the so-called airport games [5]). Inaddition to the conditions guaranteeing the non-emptiness of the cores, some types ofnon-dominated imputations of these games are also described. For the fuzzy airport games, such adescription is exhaustive.
KW - core of fuzzy cooperative game
KW - fuzzy airport game
KW - fuzzy cooperative game
KW - fuzzy LP-game
KW - fuzzy TU market game
KW - V-balancedness
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85102399141&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/0d01038e-2da2-3bec-9daf-c8751c567718/
U2 - 10.1134/S0005117921020148
DO - 10.1134/S0005117921020148
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85102399141
VL - 82
SP - 364
EP - 374
JO - Automation and Remote Control
JF - Automation and Remote Control
SN - 0005-1179
IS - 2
ER -
ID: 28073344