Standard

Why meno's paradox is more stubborn than Aristotle's solution suggests? / Berestov, Igor.

In: Schole, Vol. 11, No. 2, 01.01.2017, p. 505-514.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

APA

Vancouver

Berestov I. Why meno's paradox is more stubborn than Aristotle's solution suggests? Schole. 2017 Jan 1;11(2):505-514. doi: 10.21267/AQUILO.2017.11.6477

Author

BibTeX

@article{4800d4a745b946a29e1d003bb6ed2b4c,
title = "Why meno's paradox is more stubborn than Aristotle's solution suggests?",
abstract = "In the present paper, we analyze Aristotle's solution of Meno's Paradox in his An. Post. I, 1.71a17-71b8, where he seeks to demonstrate that Plato's assertion that it is impossible to search for an unknown object is false. We show that such an interpretation of Aristotle's solution is very generous on his part. We demonstrate that the search in Aristotle's solution is quite naturally treated as a search for an object that satisfies the search conditions and that this treating of the search in question allows to write down a formally correct notation with the epistemic operators. Nevertheless, this interpretation of Meno's Paradox solution, despite all its merits, turns out to be defenseless against an alternative that is similar to the original paradox, to wit: if the object to be searched for is fixed, then it is meaningless to search for it; if it is not fixed, then even the realized desire to find such an object will never fix the object that satisfies the search conditions.",
keywords = "Attitude ascription, De dicto, De re, Meno's Paradox, Possibility of inquiry, Posterior Analytics, Search for knowledge",
author = "Igor Berestov",
year = "2017",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.21267/AQUILO.2017.11.6477",
language = "English",
volume = "11",
pages = "505--514",
journal = "Schole",
issn = "1995-4328",
publisher = "Novosibirskij Gosudarstvennyj Universitet",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Why meno's paradox is more stubborn than Aristotle's solution suggests?

AU - Berestov, Igor

PY - 2017/1/1

Y1 - 2017/1/1

N2 - In the present paper, we analyze Aristotle's solution of Meno's Paradox in his An. Post. I, 1.71a17-71b8, where he seeks to demonstrate that Plato's assertion that it is impossible to search for an unknown object is false. We show that such an interpretation of Aristotle's solution is very generous on his part. We demonstrate that the search in Aristotle's solution is quite naturally treated as a search for an object that satisfies the search conditions and that this treating of the search in question allows to write down a formally correct notation with the epistemic operators. Nevertheless, this interpretation of Meno's Paradox solution, despite all its merits, turns out to be defenseless against an alternative that is similar to the original paradox, to wit: if the object to be searched for is fixed, then it is meaningless to search for it; if it is not fixed, then even the realized desire to find such an object will never fix the object that satisfies the search conditions.

AB - In the present paper, we analyze Aristotle's solution of Meno's Paradox in his An. Post. I, 1.71a17-71b8, where he seeks to demonstrate that Plato's assertion that it is impossible to search for an unknown object is false. We show that such an interpretation of Aristotle's solution is very generous on his part. We demonstrate that the search in Aristotle's solution is quite naturally treated as a search for an object that satisfies the search conditions and that this treating of the search in question allows to write down a formally correct notation with the epistemic operators. Nevertheless, this interpretation of Meno's Paradox solution, despite all its merits, turns out to be defenseless against an alternative that is similar to the original paradox, to wit: if the object to be searched for is fixed, then it is meaningless to search for it; if it is not fixed, then even the realized desire to find such an object will never fix the object that satisfies the search conditions.

KW - Attitude ascription

KW - De dicto

KW - De re

KW - Meno's Paradox

KW - Possibility of inquiry

KW - Posterior Analytics

KW - Search for knowledge

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85026911691&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.21267/AQUILO.2017.11.6477

DO - 10.21267/AQUILO.2017.11.6477

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85026911691

VL - 11

SP - 505

EP - 514

JO - Schole

JF - Schole

SN - 1995-4328

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 9966837