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Retailer leadership under monopolistic competition. / Тильзо, Ольга александровна.

In: Mathematical Game Theory and Applications, Vol. 14, No. 2, 18.01.2023, p. 76-98.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Тильзо, ОА 2023, 'Retailer leadership under monopolistic competition', Mathematical Game Theory and Applications, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 76-98. https://doi.org/10.17076/mgta_2022_2_52

APA

Тильзо, О. А. (2023). Retailer leadership under monopolistic competition. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications, 14(2), 76-98. https://doi.org/10.17076/mgta_2022_2_52

Vancouver

Тильзо ОА. Retailer leadership under monopolistic competition. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications. 2023 Jan 18;14(2):76-98. doi: 10.17076/mgta_2022_2_52

Author

Тильзо, Ольга александровна. / Retailer leadership under monopolistic competition. In: Mathematical Game Theory and Applications. 2023 ; Vol. 14, No. 2. pp. 76-98.

BibTeX

@article{82fd3aabc7c74c8b8591fe79e1217301,
title = "Retailer leadership under monopolistic competition",
abstract = "A modification of the Dixit-Stiglitz model, supplemented by retailing, is investigated, namely, various situations of equilibrium according to Stackelberg are considered under the leadership of the retailer and the free entry condition of manufacturers to the market. For each of the situations, detailed solutions were provided, which were considered taking into account the preferences of the participants in the market interaction. This allows us to understand the occurrence of which of the considered situations is most beneficial for the retailer, manufacturers and for society as a whole. Moreover, optimal taxation is considered. Situations are revealed when it is beneficial for the state to tax the producer, and when, on the contrary, to subsidize the producer.",
author = "Тильзо, {Ольга александровна}",
note = "O. Tilzo Retailer leadership under monopolistic competition / O. Tilzo // Mathematical game theory and its applications. – 2023. – Vol. 14, No. 2. – P. 76-98. – DOI 10.17076/mgta_2022_2_52.",
year = "2023",
month = jan,
day = "18",
doi = "10.17076/mgta_2022_2_52",
language = "English",
volume = "14",
pages = "76--98",
journal = "Mathematical Game Theory and Applications",
issn = "2074-9872",
publisher = "Карельский научный центр РАН",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Retailer leadership under monopolistic competition

AU - Тильзо, Ольга александровна

N1 - O. Tilzo Retailer leadership under monopolistic competition / O. Tilzo // Mathematical game theory and its applications. – 2023. – Vol. 14, No. 2. – P. 76-98. – DOI 10.17076/mgta_2022_2_52.

PY - 2023/1/18

Y1 - 2023/1/18

N2 - A modification of the Dixit-Stiglitz model, supplemented by retailing, is investigated, namely, various situations of equilibrium according to Stackelberg are considered under the leadership of the retailer and the free entry condition of manufacturers to the market. For each of the situations, detailed solutions were provided, which were considered taking into account the preferences of the participants in the market interaction. This allows us to understand the occurrence of which of the considered situations is most beneficial for the retailer, manufacturers and for society as a whole. Moreover, optimal taxation is considered. Situations are revealed when it is beneficial for the state to tax the producer, and when, on the contrary, to subsidize the producer.

AB - A modification of the Dixit-Stiglitz model, supplemented by retailing, is investigated, namely, various situations of equilibrium according to Stackelberg are considered under the leadership of the retailer and the free entry condition of manufacturers to the market. For each of the situations, detailed solutions were provided, which were considered taking into account the preferences of the participants in the market interaction. This allows us to understand the occurrence of which of the considered situations is most beneficial for the retailer, manufacturers and for society as a whole. Moreover, optimal taxation is considered. Situations are revealed when it is beneficial for the state to tax the producer, and when, on the contrary, to subsidize the producer.

UR - https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=60348570

U2 - 10.17076/mgta_2022_2_52

DO - 10.17076/mgta_2022_2_52

M3 - Article

VL - 14

SP - 76

EP - 98

JO - Mathematical Game Theory and Applications

JF - Mathematical Game Theory and Applications

SN - 2074-9872

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 71982992