Standard

Pyrrhonian skepticism and Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. / Tselishchev, Vitaly.

In: Schole, Vol. 12, No. 2, 01.01.2018, p. 551-560.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Tselishchev, V 2018, 'Pyrrhonian skepticism and Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem', Schole, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 551-560. https://doi.org/10.21267/schole.12.2.15

APA

Tselishchev, V. (2018). Pyrrhonian skepticism and Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. Schole, 12(2), 551-560. https://doi.org/10.21267/schole.12.2.15

Vancouver

Tselishchev V. Pyrrhonian skepticism and Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. Schole. 2018 Jan 1;12(2):551-560. doi: 10.21267/schole.12.2.15

Author

Tselishchev, Vitaly. / Pyrrhonian skepticism and Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. In: Schole. 2018 ; Vol. 12, No. 2. pp. 551-560.

BibTeX

@article{3d6019ad814d48319bf5169915ec091b,
title = "Pyrrhonian skepticism and G{\"o}del{\textquoteright}s second incompleteness theorem",
abstract = "The article compares the Pyrrhonian skepticism with the interpretations of G{\"o}del's Second Theorem as a skeptical challenge in modern mathematics. It is shown that the epistemological framework of G{\"o}del's restrictive theorems fits into the skeptical reflection scheme of Sextus Empiricus.",
keywords = "Consistency, G{\"o}del, Intensionality, Isostheneia, Metamathematics, Second incompleteness theorem, Sextus Empiricus, consistency, isostheneia, intensionality, Godel, metamathematics",
author = "Vitaly Tselishchev",
year = "2018",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.21267/schole.12.2.15",
language = "English",
volume = "12",
pages = "551--560",
journal = "Schole",
issn = "1995-4328",
publisher = "Novosibirskij Gosudarstvennyj Universitet",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Pyrrhonian skepticism and Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem

AU - Tselishchev, Vitaly

PY - 2018/1/1

Y1 - 2018/1/1

N2 - The article compares the Pyrrhonian skepticism with the interpretations of Gödel's Second Theorem as a skeptical challenge in modern mathematics. It is shown that the epistemological framework of Gödel's restrictive theorems fits into the skeptical reflection scheme of Sextus Empiricus.

AB - The article compares the Pyrrhonian skepticism with the interpretations of Gödel's Second Theorem as a skeptical challenge in modern mathematics. It is shown that the epistemological framework of Gödel's restrictive theorems fits into the skeptical reflection scheme of Sextus Empiricus.

KW - Consistency

KW - Gödel

KW - Intensionality

KW - Isostheneia

KW - Metamathematics

KW - Second incompleteness theorem

KW - Sextus Empiricus

KW - consistency

KW - isostheneia

KW - intensionality

KW - Godel

KW - metamathematics

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85049183451&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.21267/schole.12.2.15

DO - 10.21267/schole.12.2.15

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85049183451

VL - 12

SP - 551

EP - 560

JO - Schole

JF - Schole

SN - 1995-4328

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 14278845