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Liar paradox in traditional and modern logic. / Khlebalin, Aleksandr.

In: Schole, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2017, p. 536-544.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Khlebalin, A 2017, 'Liar paradox in traditional and modern logic', Schole, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 536-544. https://doi.org/10.21267/AQUILO.2017.11.6480

APA

Khlebalin, A. (2017). Liar paradox in traditional and modern logic. Schole, 11(2), 536-544. https://doi.org/10.21267/AQUILO.2017.11.6480

Vancouver

Khlebalin A. Liar paradox in traditional and modern logic. Schole. 2017;11(2):536-544. doi: 10.21267/AQUILO.2017.11.6480

Author

Khlebalin, Aleksandr. / Liar paradox in traditional and modern logic. In: Schole. 2017 ; Vol. 11, No. 2. pp. 536-544.

BibTeX

@article{481bcd56cc364556920abc77b19e62ab,
title = "Liar paradox in traditional and modern logic",
abstract = "It is well known that mathematical logic helps to reveal a general scheme of selfreference for generating paradoxes, which makes it possible to present the Liar as a special case of self-reference, the analysis of which requires the involvement of the concepts of expressiveness and provability. This contemporary approach, at least partially was developed on the basis of classical solutions of the paradox, which still merit some attention. Based on a comparison of the formulations and approaches to the solution for the Liar's paradox, proposed in traditional and modern logic, in the article I seek to demonstrate differences in the role this paradox played in contemporary and classical theories of truth.",
keywords = "Diagonal argument, Liar paradox, Logical theory of truth, Truth theory",
author = "Aleksandr Khlebalin",
year = "2017",
doi = "10.21267/AQUILO.2017.11.6480",
language = "English",
volume = "11",
pages = "536--544",
journal = "Schole",
issn = "1995-4328",
publisher = "Novosibirskij Gosudarstvennyj Universitet",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Liar paradox in traditional and modern logic

AU - Khlebalin, Aleksandr

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - It is well known that mathematical logic helps to reveal a general scheme of selfreference for generating paradoxes, which makes it possible to present the Liar as a special case of self-reference, the analysis of which requires the involvement of the concepts of expressiveness and provability. This contemporary approach, at least partially was developed on the basis of classical solutions of the paradox, which still merit some attention. Based on a comparison of the formulations and approaches to the solution for the Liar's paradox, proposed in traditional and modern logic, in the article I seek to demonstrate differences in the role this paradox played in contemporary and classical theories of truth.

AB - It is well known that mathematical logic helps to reveal a general scheme of selfreference for generating paradoxes, which makes it possible to present the Liar as a special case of self-reference, the analysis of which requires the involvement of the concepts of expressiveness and provability. This contemporary approach, at least partially was developed on the basis of classical solutions of the paradox, which still merit some attention. Based on a comparison of the formulations and approaches to the solution for the Liar's paradox, proposed in traditional and modern logic, in the article I seek to demonstrate differences in the role this paradox played in contemporary and classical theories of truth.

KW - Diagonal argument

KW - Liar paradox

KW - Logical theory of truth

KW - Truth theory

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85026906880&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.21267/AQUILO.2017.11.6480

DO - 10.21267/AQUILO.2017.11.6480

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85026906880

VL - 11

SP - 536

EP - 544

JO - Schole

JF - Schole

SN - 1995-4328

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 9054028