Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
Estimates of Implementation Complexity for Quantum Cryptanalysis of Post-Quantum Lattice-Based Cryptosystems. / Bakharev, A. O.
In: Journal of Applied and Industrial Mathematics, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1, 09.2023, p. 459-482.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Estimates of Implementation Complexity for Quantum Cryptanalysis of Post-Quantum Lattice-Based Cryptosystems
AU - Bakharev, A. O.
N1 - This work was supported by the Mathematical Center in Akademgorodok under the agreement with the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of Russia, agreement no. 075–15–2022–282.
PY - 2023/9
Y1 - 2023/9
N2 - Due to the development of quantum computing, there is a need for the development andanalysis of cryptosystems resistant to attacks using a quantum computer (post-quantumcryptography algorithms). The security of many well-known post-quantum cryptosystems basedon lattice theory depends on the complexity of solving the shortest vector problem (SVP). In thispaper, a model of quantum oracle developed from Grover’s algorithm is described to implementa hybrid quantum–classical algorithm based on GaussSieve. This algorithm can be used forattacks on cryptosystems whose security depends on solving the SVP. Upper bounds for thenumber of qubits and the depth of the circuit were obtained for two implementations of theproposed quantum oracle model: minimizing the number of qubits and minimizing the circuitdepth. The complexity of implementing the proposed quantum oracle model to attackpost-quantum lattice-based cryptosystems that are finalists of the NIST post-quantumcryptography competition is analyzed.
AB - Due to the development of quantum computing, there is a need for the development andanalysis of cryptosystems resistant to attacks using a quantum computer (post-quantumcryptography algorithms). The security of many well-known post-quantum cryptosystems basedon lattice theory depends on the complexity of solving the shortest vector problem (SVP). In thispaper, a model of quantum oracle developed from Grover’s algorithm is described to implementa hybrid quantum–classical algorithm based on GaussSieve. This algorithm can be used forattacks on cryptosystems whose security depends on solving the SVP. Upper bounds for thenumber of qubits and the depth of the circuit were obtained for two implementations of theproposed quantum oracle model: minimizing the number of qubits and minimizing the circuitdepth. The complexity of implementing the proposed quantum oracle model to attackpost-quantum lattice-based cryptosystems that are finalists of the NIST post-quantumcryptography competition is analyzed.
KW - Grover’s algorithm
KW - lattice-based cryptography
KW - post-quantum cryptography
KW - public-key cryptography
KW - quantum computation
KW - quantum search
UR - https://www.scopus.com/record/display.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85175805595&origin=inward&txGid=7cfb545bdcb29cd4b17c52ba07b4ce42
UR - https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=63978955
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/62e3c924-39ec-3ed8-bb6e-58b3b7b2dad9/
U2 - 10.1134/S1990478923030018
DO - 10.1134/S1990478923030018
M3 - Article
VL - 17
SP - 459
EP - 482
JO - Journal of Applied and Industrial Mathematics
JF - Journal of Applied and Industrial Mathematics
SN - 1990-4789
IS - 3
M1 - 1
ER -
ID: 59554055