Standard

A Bilevel Competitive Location and Pricing Model with Nonuniform Split of Demand. / Kononov, A. V.; Panin, A. A.; Plyasunov, A. V.

In: Journal of Applied and Industrial Mathematics, Vol. 13, No. 3, 01.07.2019, p. 500-510.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Kononov, AV, Panin, AA & Plyasunov, AV 2019, 'A Bilevel Competitive Location and Pricing Model with Nonuniform Split of Demand', Journal of Applied and Industrial Mathematics, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 500-510. https://doi.org/10.1134/S1990478919030104

APA

Kononov, A. V., Panin, A. A., & Plyasunov, A. V. (2019). A Bilevel Competitive Location and Pricing Model with Nonuniform Split of Demand. Journal of Applied and Industrial Mathematics, 13(3), 500-510. https://doi.org/10.1134/S1990478919030104

Vancouver

Kononov AV, Panin AA, Plyasunov AV. A Bilevel Competitive Location and Pricing Model with Nonuniform Split of Demand. Journal of Applied and Industrial Mathematics. 2019 Jul 1;13(3):500-510. doi: 10.1134/S1990478919030104

Author

Kononov, A. V. ; Panin, A. A. ; Plyasunov, A. V. / A Bilevel Competitive Location and Pricing Model with Nonuniform Split of Demand. In: Journal of Applied and Industrial Mathematics. 2019 ; Vol. 13, No. 3. pp. 500-510.

BibTeX

@article{66ae274eb0c14199838160370a362212,
title = "A Bilevel Competitive Location and Pricing Model with Nonuniform Split of Demand",
abstract = "Under study is the bilevel competitive facility location and pricing problem which is formulated in terms of the Stackelberg game. The problem involves the two producers: the Leader and the Competitor. They consistently place their facilities and set prices. The choice of prices is based on the Bertrand model of price competition and the possibility of dividing a client{\textquoteright}s demand if this will be profitable for both players. In this case, the demand is divided between the players in a given proportion. The complexity is investigated of finding the optimal solution of the problem and its particular cases. It is shown that the problem is Σ2P-hard. However, under certain conditions on the input parameters, the complexity decreases significantly and in some cases the problem becomes polynomially solvable.",
keywords = "Bertrand model, bilevel problem, complexity, facility location, polynomial hierarchy, pricing, Stackelberg game",
author = "Kononov, {A. V.} and Panin, {A. A.} and Plyasunov, {A. V.}",
year = "2019",
month = jul,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1134/S1990478919030104",
language = "English",
volume = "13",
pages = "500--510",
journal = "Journal of Applied and Industrial Mathematics",
issn = "1990-4789",
publisher = "Maik Nauka-Interperiodica Publishing",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A Bilevel Competitive Location and Pricing Model with Nonuniform Split of Demand

AU - Kononov, A. V.

AU - Panin, A. A.

AU - Plyasunov, A. V.

PY - 2019/7/1

Y1 - 2019/7/1

N2 - Under study is the bilevel competitive facility location and pricing problem which is formulated in terms of the Stackelberg game. The problem involves the two producers: the Leader and the Competitor. They consistently place their facilities and set prices. The choice of prices is based on the Bertrand model of price competition and the possibility of dividing a client’s demand if this will be profitable for both players. In this case, the demand is divided between the players in a given proportion. The complexity is investigated of finding the optimal solution of the problem and its particular cases. It is shown that the problem is Σ2P-hard. However, under certain conditions on the input parameters, the complexity decreases significantly and in some cases the problem becomes polynomially solvable.

AB - Under study is the bilevel competitive facility location and pricing problem which is formulated in terms of the Stackelberg game. The problem involves the two producers: the Leader and the Competitor. They consistently place their facilities and set prices. The choice of prices is based on the Bertrand model of price competition and the possibility of dividing a client’s demand if this will be profitable for both players. In this case, the demand is divided between the players in a given proportion. The complexity is investigated of finding the optimal solution of the problem and its particular cases. It is shown that the problem is Σ2P-hard. However, under certain conditions on the input parameters, the complexity decreases significantly and in some cases the problem becomes polynomially solvable.

KW - Bertrand model

KW - bilevel problem

KW - complexity

KW - facility location

KW - polynomial hierarchy

KW - pricing

KW - Stackelberg game

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85067653979&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1134/S1990478919030104

DO - 10.1134/S1990478919030104

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85067653979

VL - 13

SP - 500

EP - 510

JO - Journal of Applied and Industrial Mathematics

JF - Journal of Applied and Industrial Mathematics

SN - 1990-4789

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 21472526